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On mobilization the Territorial Army could additionally form 36 battalions 1 armored reconnaissance, 4 light recce, and 31 infantry -- as well as other units. Major changes 1 mechanized brigade is to be created by reassigning, restructuring, and strengthening elements of the existing airborne brigade, which will be dissolved. And, The 6 remaining tank regiments are to be enlarged to become tank units formerly they had 38 -- however, only 30 tanks per unit will be kept in the front line day- to- day.

The envisaged reduction in TA numbers from 57, down to 40, will certainly result in fewer combat formations available on mobilization. But the number of individually qualified specialists is due to go up. Thus, the quality of the TA can be expected to increase. All in all the British Army continues to emphasize mechanization and mobility. It is meant to be a multi-purpose force with counter offensive capabilities at the operational level, but also with commando and counter-terror elements.

The relative proportion of the British Army's light elements appears to be reduced in the new plan.

This is indicated by the transformation of the airborne to a mechanized brigade and by the TA's planned loss in manpower. The remaining light formations are supposed to gain in quality, however. This is indicated not only by the upgrading of the TA, but also - and particularly - by the creation of the air-maneuver formation based on the former airmobile brigade. In the short term, two squadrons 36 combat aircraft are to be cut from the force, while four large C 17 transport planes will be added.

Historically, there has been in the RAF a dominance of ground attack over air defense elements. This is not likely to change with the planned procurement of the Eurofighter. Despite its image as a fighter, the Eurofighter can and will be employed in a ground attack role. Major changes There will be a reduction in the number of submarine-based nuclear warheads from 96 to 48 per vessels; The attack submarine fleet is due to be cut from 12 to 10 vessels; 2 new, large aircraft carriers are planned to replace the 3 smaller carriers after ; 20 The frigate and destroyer force is to be reduced from 35 to 32; and The force of mine countermeasure vessels is to increase from 18 to In its structure and plans the Navy has tried to combine capacities for power projection, oceanic control, and littoral warfare.

The standard vessels for oceanic control are likely to be versatile frigates 4, - 5, ts. There are no plans to build more destroyers. At the theater-related level, the airborne ground surveillance system ASTOR has reached an advanced stage of procurement planning. The main holdings of weapon systems and respective plans for the three services in were as follows:.

The Army's modernization plan appears to be relatively cautious. The procurement of the American Apache helicopters plus weaponry is certainly a "big deal". But it was decided long before the SDR. This applies also to the Challenger 2 program. Concerning its ground-mobile fighting platforms, the British Army does not measure up to the highest technological standards.

It is internationally shared expert opinion that Challenger 2 and AS are inferior to the German Leo 2 and the armored howitzer respectively. And the Saxon, a wheeled armored personnel carrier, has been compared by a renowned British military expert, the late General Richard E. Simpkin, to the vehicles of the German Reichswehr of the s. Air Force equipment and procurement In this service had Tornado aircraft, of which about were equipped for defensive air patrolling. There are also 54 Jaguar, 69 Harrier, and 54 armed Hawk trainers, plus the surveillance and transport platforms mentioned above.

The aircraft to be phased out soon are probably 23 Jaguars and 13 air-defense Tornado. Since there are about Eurofighters to be procured, and no plans to increase the number of flying squadrons, it is likely that the Eurofighter fleet will replace not only Jaguar and Tornado air-defense aircraft, but also some Tornado fighter bombers. In a long-term perspective there is a commitment to participate in the American Joint Strike Fighter program. Navy equipment and procurement Two new attack submarines are to be built as a replacement for old ones and more of the attack submarine fleet shall be made capable of firing Tomahawk cruise missiles.

Four more minehunters are to be bought, and the amphibious brigade is going to be beefed up which - among other things - means that four more roll-on roll-off ships will have to be put into service. In overview, it looks as if the Royal Navy is accumulating resources and support for its grand ambition: to rejoin in the league of nations possessing "real" aircraft carriers. Moreover, it believes it can do this at limited costs. At first glance the remaining force of 4 subs Vanguard class with 64 Trident D 5 missiles and reduced numbers of warheads 48 for the one vessel on patrol at any given time and fewer than altogether resembles a last resort, minimum-deterrent configuration.

And the SDR uses language to support this notion. Nonetheless, the Trident D 5 is sufficiently accurate to be used for limited nuclear warfighting at the sub-strategic level. As nuclear weapons appear to be the status guarantors of the past, there is now much more interest in capacities for conventional power projection.

Power projection is the status bringer of the present and the future -- even more so when development along this path takes a high-tech turn. Nonetheless, the SDR does not view long-range precision strike and "information war" capabilities as the essence of power projection. Rather, such capabilities serve simply to establish a favorable context for the insertion of troops. In this respect the SDR outlines rather concrete intervention scenarios and guidance for force deployment:.

In addition to providing whatever military support is required to continuing commitments such as Northern Ireland, we should be able to: Respond to a major international crisis which might require a military effort and combat operations of a similar scale and duration as the Gulf War when we deployed an armoured division, 26 major warships and over 80 combat aircraft, or Undertake a more extended overseas deployment on a lesser scale as over the last few years in Bosnia while retaining the ability to mount a second substantial deployment - which might involve a combat brigade and appropriate naval and air forces We would not, however, expect both deployments to involve warfighting or to maintain them simultaneously for longer than six months.

Relevant to this goal, the British commitment to Bosnia-Herzegovina and, now, Kosovo involves well over two brigades. From the present vantage point September , it seems likely that the U. Although the SDR employs the language and touts the goals of a "Revolution in Military Affairs", some of its force structure and procurement choices run counter to the logic of the RMA discourse.

Central to the RMA vision of the future is the view that traditional weapon platforms and large force concentrations will become increasingly vulnerable as smart weaponry spreads. Thus, there is a need to move systematically to a more dispersed and networked array of capabilities.

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As the authors of a Centre for Defense Studies critique of the SDR see it, "This sits poorly with the proposed concentration of UK forces into a small number of high value assets such as aircraft carriers and transport ships loaded with tanks". The British understanding of the requirements for respectable power projection seems to have led to a gradual expansion of the British Army at the expense especially of the RAF's active personnel share.

But this has not been matched by adequate procurement policies for the Army. The problem is not simply a lack of funding. Also important is the insistence on "buying British" which in some cases has resulted in sub-optimal choices. This problem, however, may be politically immune to solution.

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If so, vital elements of the British Army for example: mechanized infantry may have to live with technological obsolescence. Finally, a central declared goal of present British defense policy is to contribute proactively to "making the world a safer place". The British forces could facilitate their pursuit of this goal by concentrating less than planned on the development of strike capabilities, which are suited best for escalation. A more stabilizing and less expensive method of crisis management would emphasize the defensive protection and control of territories under threat.

Moving fast to stem tension in a crisis zone before it escalates is more important, effective, and stabilizing than the option of striking hard and deep from "over the horizon" after atrocities have begun to mount. This points to the tension between the British forces' RMA aspirations and their commitment to conducting stability operations as needed.

Resolving this tension in favor of force structure and procurement choices suited to stability operations might also help resolve the forces' impending budget crunch. Ninety-one percent of this total had been spent by February As this program winds down, spending on the Eurofighter will rise dramatically over the next three years. The first of these aircraft is planned to enter service by the end of As a result, non-procurement spending will have to fall by around 7 percent in real terms to meet the planned 4 percent reduction in the overall budget.

Planned reductions especially in the front line of Navy and Air Force will certainly make a major contribution to the required savings in operating costs. Very important in this respect will be the further success of the MoD's Efficiency Programme , which sets targets for increases in efficiency, defined in terms of reducing the resources needed to produce any given defense output. Additional measures to reduce operating costs are also on the agenda.

In this regard, the SDR's emphasis on "jointness" has pivotal importance. It aims to realize new efficiencies by prompting the services to combine their operations and organizations in those many fields where they overlap. The potential savings in operations and maintenance expenditures might be absorbed, however, by increases in the personnel account.

Past experience in Britain shows service pay rising at a rate 2 percent higher than price inflation comparable with the average increase of national earnings. Should this trend continue, it might absorb whatever savings are achieved through new efficiency measures. The procurement programs may not afford much flexibility, however. This is partly because the attenuation of these programs would incur cost overruns. Thus, attention turns to cuts in the personnel account.

One renowned British defense economist, Malcolm Chalmers, foresees a worst-case scenario in which the SDR's personnel planning is seriously derailed. And after , matters may get worse. Looking forward to the year , Chalmers projects a total personnel strength of , service and civilian personnel combined , which is only 77 percent as many personnel as employed today.

This convergence of labor and conservative opinion is not conducive to a broad debate on the general direction of military planning. Hence, the debates ahead will have less to do with orientation, more with feasibility. Within this confine, the United Kingdom has a choice between two options of how to further develop its defense policy:. One possibility would be to stabilize or even to increase the relative GDP share of the defense sector. Only this would make it possible to credibly pursue the power and status aspirations manifest in the SDR. However, Britain already spends relatively more of its GDP on defense than do states of comparable size and wealth.

The other option is to concentrate on military capabilities that promise relatively high gains in national profile and international status. These capabilities would be developed alone or in close co-operation with a favorite, prestigious partner - such as the U. The long-term consequences of such a development could be interesting - and probably quite a surprise to a British nationalist. Great Britain's defenses might in the end be more closely integrated with their continental counterparts than ever before or they might become "colonized" by the forces of Great Britain's former colony, the U.

Access to a better set of choices than this will have to await a more daring approach to security policy than Britain's defense planners have managed so far.

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The military forces of the Federal Republic of Germany FRG have been considered since their founding in to be the "alliance army" par excellence. It is particularly interesting, therefore, to examine the effect that changes in NATO have had on the evolution of the post-Cold War German forces. Also relevant is the effect on German policy of reunification and the associated renewal of national identity, a phenomenon that has analogs throughout central and eastern Europe. In developing new military orientations and structures, the German leadership has had to struggle with the acute resource constraints of the defense sector -- constraints more serious than in most other NATO countries.

At a time when public support for defense expenditures has dropped sharply due to the end of the East-West confrontation , two factors have placed a particularly heavy burden on Germany's public budgets:. For these reasons, reporting on Germany's defense implies a study of "how to plan in a context of relative scarcity". Interpreting these figures in terms of the portion of GDP spent on defense signifies an even more dramatic development: Whereas defense expenditure claimed 3. The figure for was 2. Some German leaders balk at this comparison -- 50 percent versus 29 -- pointing out that the NATO Europe figure includes countries whose security-policy context and military make-up are substantially different than those of the majority of NATO countries in Europe.

In , total defense expenditures in Germany amounted to DM These two figures imply shares of GDP somewhat over and below 1. Defense spending in a narrower sense without related pensions amounted to DM After several revisions, official figures for the subsequent years are now in billion DM, current terms :. At the time of writing September these government figures have not yet passed Parliament.

However, the prospective reduction in military spending is a feature of the tough, comprehensive, austerity program now in process. Influential experts claim that, given Germany's special fiscal burdens, there is no viable alternative to such measures. Thus, future parliamentary action will likely affect only the subsidiary aspects of the program, not its core features.

Assuming a modest GDP deflator of 1. This means that between and there will be, in real terms, a decrease in defense spending narrowly defined of nearly 10 percent. This number comprised , conscripts or 41 percent of the total , , volunteers with limited contracts 2 - 15 years or lifetime commitments, and also 2, active reserve training posts.

About 90, reservists per year undergo refresher training courses of 1 or 2 weeks duration. The bulk of the conscripts serve 10 months. Only relatively few probably one in ten have chosen the option of extending their period of service 12 - 23 months. Current planning aims for numbers which are not significantly different: an active total of somewhat over ,, consisting of , conscripts 40 percent of the total , about , longer-term volunteers and 1, reserve training posts.

In the Bundeswehr had , regular soldiers, a number relatively stable until the end of the Cold War. This active strength comprised , conscripts serving 15 months , which was 48 percent of the total, , longer-term volunteers, and 6, reserve duty positions. The pool of trained reserves had a strength of , Thus, between and , Germany's active military strength declined by , soldiers or 30 percent. Moreover, the conscripts' service terms were reduced, first to 12 months and then to 10, which some analysts and leaders claim has had a negative effect on their training.

However, parallel to the shortening of conscript training time, the proportion of conscripts in the forces went down by 7 percentage points or 15 percent. Also between and the reserves were reduced by , or over 40 percent. This leaves a still sizeable reserve force of , but it has become less important in the overall array than during the time of the Central European confrontation.

In the unlikely case of a major crisis in Central Europe the German forces could still grow up to a total size of over , soldiers. The integration of the reservists would beef up the forces' and especially the Army's command and logistical infrastructure. However, most of the reservists are intended to fill the Army's skeletonized units or serve as group-wise replacements "Feldersatz" in combat units.

Recently, policy-makers have been considering the option of "inviting" reservists specialists to join crisis reaction missions abroad. Turning to the status of the civilian personnel working in the Bundeswehr's administration: During the s the size of this complement averaged around , people.

The current figure is somewhat over , Further limited decreases probably down to , are considered possible. This means that, according to current planning, the overall number of personnel uniformed and civilian combined is likely to decline slightly over the next three years. The main conclusions of this early, official reassessment were that:. Germany is no longer a frontline state, but surrounded by allies and friends, Germany now finds herself outside the reach of an opponent capable of strategic offensive operations, yet at the same time faces a growing danger of regional conflicts in and outside Europe that relate to the security of Germany.

In the military press, especially, there has been an effort to broaden the spectrum of risks under consideration. For example, there have been allusions to potential dangers stemming from international terrorism, piracy, organized crime, and "unfriendly acts" by suppliers of raw materials and other essential goods to the nation's economy. Based on these risks originating in a "wider notion of security" new tasks have been deduced for the armed forces tasks that, to some extent, could be regarded as secondary or as overlapping with missions typical of modern paramilitary police organizations.

A far-reaching extension of military tasks into the domestic sphere has not become the official line of the German MoD, however. Instead, a clear-cut division of labor with paramilitary police such as the federal border guards and the state police forces has been maintained.

The only secondary task of the Bundeswehr that found increased support and acceptance is to provide assistance to other agencies in the case of natural disasters. The current official roster of basic tasks for the armed forces sees the Bundeswehr: Protecting the Federal Republic and its citizens from political blackmail and external danger, Promoting military stability and the integration of Europe, Defending the Federal Republic and her allies, Serving the goals of global peace and international security in accordance with the United Nations charter, and Helping to save lives in cases of natural disasters and other emergencies as well as supporting humanitarian actions.

Clearly, the emphasis is on employing the armed forces not only for purposes of military defense if necessary , but also for war avoidance and international stability tasks. Altruistic rationales predominate and security objectives are stated with no direct reference to the pursuit of national interest.

Explicitly talking about "national interest" or "power aspirations" has been a taboo in Germany since the Second World War. West German elites have found their country's interests best served by seeking close alliance integration and by avoiding a too independent profile in matters of foreign policy.

The idea of self-limitation lives on, but it is being increasingly combined with the notion of having to share international responsibility. There is a broad consensus that, given the experiences of the past, it is in Germany's long-term interest to preserve its reputation as a "trustworthy partner" but one who at the same time takes an active interest in the security problems of neighboring regions. At first glance, it looks as if the Bundeswehr's international integration has been intensified. A closer look, however, reveals that Germany's scope for maneuver in the field of military policy has widened considerably.

During the Cold War, the Bundeswehr, with all its three services, was the only Western force fully integrated into NATO's structures: under alliance command even in peacetime. The ground force corps of the Bundeswehr formed elements of NATO's famous "layer cake" structure: in other words, they were tightly jammed between the other allies' corps sectors and this required very close operational co-operation. The layer-cake system was abandoned soon after and much more flexible patterns of alliance integration grew up. Compared to the cold-war years, considerably fewer forces of Germany's partner countries are now stationed on the Federal Republic's territory, although they routinely visit for joint exercises.

Today, out of a total of seven German ground-mobile divisions, six are integrated with allied corps structures. The remaining German ground-mobile division, which is so far "non-aligned", awaits partners in the Czech Republic or even Hungary. In addition to the six German divisions geared toward multinational integration there is also one airmobile division under national command. A comparative analysis of these newly developed corps shows that, wherever Germany co- operates with smaller neighbors, the command and support structures are controlled and mainly operated by the Bundeswehr.

The co-operation with the Americans is different, however. In this case, the components of the respective corps remain separate entities. Thus, their command and support structures allow an easy return to pre-integration procedures. These integration arrangements suggest two things: first, there is some mistrust between the Americans and Germans.

Second, there is a German inclination to exert military or even military-political influence over smaller countries. The Bundeswehr's political and military leadership made themselves advocates of a substantial enlargement well before the Clinton administration followed suit in the fall of for mainly domestic policy concerns.

It is not just through the skillful utilization of the evolving alliance structures that the German military establishment attempts to achieve a more influential posture. It also conceives measures to directly enhance Germany's national standing. The main purpose of these arrangements is to direct all German operations outside national territory. This basically army- centered scheme can be flexibly enlarged to accommodate combined operations with the Air Force and Navy.

To prevent misunderstanding: Germany does not plan for the eventuality of unilateral military intervention. On the contrary, the consensus opinion within Germany is that the nation would always need partners as a prerequisite to assuming "international responsibility" -- although it might prefer junior partners.

In this light, the aim of the new command structure is to optimize the German effort particularly in the case of power projection and to ensure that Germany's voice is heard in an international concert of intervention forces. Germany remains aware of its limitations but, within these constraints, its military establishment seeks relatively greater influence and independence. The respective figures for the Luftwaffe and the Navy were 76, 23 percent and 26, 8 percent.

In the mid-eighties, the inter-service ratios were about the same. At present, significant changes in the relative weight of the three services are not envisaged. With respect to numbers of soldiers, even in an overall shrinking force, the individual services have each managed to maintain their traditional shares. The tendency of each service to jealously protect its own special, traditional interests is also reflected in the fact that the German forces do not put much emphasis on "jointness".

There are only two initiatives in this area and neither one really trespasses on traditional service preserves: first, an evolving national command structure for power projection which is army-centered, but interfaced with air and maritime command elements and, second, a related project for the development of an all-Bundeswehr system of satellite communication. Other options for change are obvious, but lie fallow. For instance, there are no plans for a joint helicopter command, although the Army and Luftwaffe each operate relatively large numbers of rotocraft of similar make with separate logistics.

The Luftwaffe and Navy instead prefer to operate their machines separately. In plans for the current re-structuring process of the Bundeswehr were issued. The main defense forces comprise: 4 brigades to replace crisis reaction elements largely active , comprising 2 mechanized brigades, 1 mountain brigade light infantry, partly mechanized , 1 airmobile brigade; 8 mechanized brigades partly skeletonized ; and 4 mechanized brigades with extra staffing and equipment to double on mobilization. The crisis reaction forces get more modern equipment than the main defense forces.

For example, the main battle tanks of the CRF brigades are all Leopard 2s in their most advanced version, whereas the MDF still have Leo 2s without upgrade or Leopard 1s. Brigade sizes vary between 3, and 5, soldiers. Divisions can comprise between 2 and 4 brigades. Twelve of these command two tank battalions each with 53 machines per battalion and one or two battalions of armored grenadiers, mostly with heavy Armored Infantry Fighting vehicles AIFs - Marder.

Eight mechanized brigades each have one armored battalion and two battalions of armored grenadiers. The airmobile brigades comprise parachute elements as well "mini-tank" Wiesel units to be carried by heavy-lift helicopters. And the evolving air mechanized brigade will have two regiments of attack helicopters 48 machines each and one regiment of utility helicopters.

In sum: when fully mobilized, the German Army would have the equivalent of 26 combat brigades. Luftwaffe The Luftwaffe comprises: 4 fighter-bomber wings with 8 squadrons Tornado , 30 4 fighter wings with 7 squadrons F-4F and 1 squadron MiG , 1 recce wing with 2 squadrons Tornado , 1 ECR wing with 2 squadrons Tornado , SAM: 6 mixed wings each with 6 squadrons Patriot, 6 squadrons Hawk, 14 squadrons Roland , and Transport: 3 wings 4 squadrons C, 4 squadrons UH-1D, plus a variety of passenger aircraft for special missions.

Because of their generally high-degree of readiness, most of the Luftwaffe's combat elements are considered crisis-reaction capable. Nevertheless, some components are specifically earmarked for such missions - namely: 31 3 squadron-equivalents attack, 2 squadron-equivalents air defense, 1 squadron-equivalent recce, 2 mixed SAM formations other SAM formations have a lower degree of readiness , and all three transport wings. Note that, as far as the flying combat components are concerned, there is a certain emphasis on the counter offensive!

Navy Even more explicit than the Luftwaffe, the Navy states that all its fighting units are, in principle, crisis-reaction capable. Therefore, the distinction between crisis reaction and main forces is supposed to not apply. Nonetheless, planners assume that no more than 40 percent of Germany's naval and naval air forces could be used for power projection at any given time. The Navy's order of battle is: 14 submarines ts , mainly for coastal warfare; 14 principal surface combatants -- two US Charles F.

All three services together are said to be able to form a crisis reaction force of 53, soldiers - including 37, from the Army, 12, from Luftwaffe, and 4, from the Navy. These numbers refer to combat, combat support elements, and the immediate command and control structure only. It has been estimated that generating such a force for power projection requires a personnel basis of 70, to 80, soldiers at home. Both have German-designed mm guns. The Marder weighs 35 tons - nearly 50 percent more than its U. The Luchs is an 8-wheeled reconnaissance vehicle of 20 tons weight for use over relatively long operational ranges.

And, The Fuchs, a 6-wheeled APC in its upgraded versions also with up to 20 tons weight , is of comparable operational mobility. The artillery branch has in addition to approximately pieces of field artillery: American- built M self-propelled howitzers in an upgraded version and MLRS Multiple Launch Rocket Systems. It is also noteworthy that there are over light anti-armor helicopters the relatively stealthy BO equipped with 6 HOT missiles each and over heavy-load CH G helicopters each carrying two 3.

Germany possesses Wiesels, which employ either TOW anti-armor missiles or a 20 mm-machine cannon. The Luftwaffe sports Tornados: its offensive mainstay. It also has about Phantoms and 23 MiG, both in an air-defense role. The backbone of its transport fleet are 84 Cs 16 tons load over non-strategic distances. The Navy shows blue water aspirations which, so far, have been indicated by the shrinking of the coastal submarine fleet from 25 boats to 14 and the intended stabilization in numbers of the principal surface combatants accompanied by a growth in their size, sea-worthiness and combat potential.

All in all the Bundeswehr presents itself as a modern force, equipped for a multitude of missions offensive as well as defensive with light mobile, but also considerably heavy fighting platforms. Generally speaking, the technological level of its main weapon systems is still above the NATO average. With reference to ground forces, this is particularly easy to demonstrate: 8 European countries are currently operating or planning to procure the Leopard 2, which proved superior to the Abrams in quite a few contests.

At comparable mobility, the Marder gives better protection to its crew than Bradley and Warrior give to their complements respectively. And, the Bundeswehr is the only force in NATO that has fielded an air-transportable minitank for crisis reaction troops.

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There is grave concern, however, that the Bundeswehr's reconnaissance and communications capabilities are not up to the tasks of global - or even continental - power projection. This is why all three services seek to modernize their own command, control and communication systems. In addition a modern interservice satellite communication capacity is to be developed. But there are no plans to acquire a Sentry-type airborne reconnaissance capability; the Bundeswehr is quite content relying on NATO's pool.

Torn between their status-related fixation on complex main weapon systems and the need to divert more resources to the acquisition of modern, theater-oriented operational surveillance systems, the Bundeswehr's planners have, so far, tended to the former. This runs counter to their often-stated desire to provide the German military with more information sources of their own: information that would make them more influential partners in the context of international co- operation.

The Army's current horizon for long-term planning is The major platforms and weapon systems that it hopes to procure between now and then include: a limited number of armored vehicles for tactical reconnaissance "Luchs" is operational level ; armored howitzers mm -- the heaviest 55 tons and most advanced piece in the world; 80 Tiger combat helicopters, lighter than AH and 83 NH medium utility helicopters to support the implementation of air mechanization plans; 1, heavy wheeled armored carriers 27 tons ; and, an unknown number of the successor to the Marder AIFV.

After the Army expects to procure more: Tigers, 1, armored transporters, and quite a few other items. Turning to the Luftwaffe: among other items, it is keen to procure before NH 90 medium utility helicopters; Eurofighters replacing - with far greater combat power - the current fleet of Phantoms ; modern weapons for the Eurofighter and Tornado such as short-range air-to-air, beyond visual range, and Taurus stand-off missiles for high-precision ground attack ; 17 Medium Air Defense Systems MEADS , an item not likely to materialize since the United States may renege on its agreement to cooperate in production of this system; and 23 FTA Future Transport Aircraft , conceptually a small version of the C with propjets for strategic missions.

To this the Navy presently hopes to add 8 frigates F , 4 oceangoing submarines, and 10 corvettes after Before the imposition of austerity measures the Bundeswehr intended to spend on these and other major items such as weaponry and advanced ammunition nearly DM 69 billion price level of between and The Navy had been allotted a 20 percent share of the total; the Luftwaffe, 46 percent the Eurofighter program alone costing over DM 20 billion ; and the Army, 34 percent.

Of course, these shares of the DM 69 billion pot apply only to major items of procurement. The Army, especially, buys a lot of other material on a routine basis such as trucks and personnel equipment , which may increase this service's share of the total procurement pie. Even taking this into account, however, it is not likely that the Army's final share will match the nearly 50 percent it typically received before the s when the Luftwaffe's share was 30 percent or a little more and the Navy's 20 percent.

So, Army commanders may have an axe to grind. On the one hand, they have been committed to the development of forces for quick-reaction missions including out-of-area missions, especially. On the other hand, they believe that Germany still needs a relatively large military machine with considerable growth mobilization potential. To be more precise: Befitting the notion of Germany as a land power, Bundeswehr planners look to maintain the largest and most capable conventional ground forces in Europe. The former orientation comports with notions of Germany's post-unification political emancipation and its assumption of a fuller if not entirely equal role in wider European and even global affairs.

In this context, it is noteworthy that Germany's contribution to international crisis reaction contingents be it the Eurocorps or the ARRC is not confined to light elements with high strategic mobility. The Bundeswehr also has earmarked heavy armored formations for purposes of crisis intervention. You must be logged in to post a review. Please log in. There are no reviews for the current version of this product Refreshing There are no reviews for previous versions of this product.

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